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Abstract
Security is a central aspect in all IT systems, but while security solutions have im-
proved and become more advanced and complex, users’ needs and requirements
have been put on the back-burner. This master’s thesis is an attempt at bring-
ing users back into focus when discussing computer security, and to propose a
security platform that is less distracting to users’ work.
The thesis has taken a user-centered approach to its design and a survey of
user behaviour and needs while working against an IT system was conducted
with contextual interviews on users in three different areas; retail, health-care
and corporate. The contextual interviews resulted in sequence models for inter-
esting user behaviour and their needs were analysed and composed into a few
key requirements for an invisible security platform.
Based on the user survey, a design proposal was created using concepts such
as proactive authentication, SSO, session roaming and operation guiding. The de-
sign also included a few non-functional requirements which need to be satisfied
in order to keep users from being distracted by the system.
Keywords:
Access Control, Computer Security, Contextual Interviews, Human Automation
Cooperation, Human Computer Interaction. Invisible Security, User-Centered
Design.
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Chapter1
Introduction
Security is a central aspect in all IT systems. As IT solutions become more ad-
vanced, demands on users to make informed and responsible decisions with re-
gard to security rises. Users often lack the training required to make these de-
cision and they cost both time and energy, which can lead to frustration and
reduced productivity. As [1] demonstrates with activation during shopping in
3D Secure solutions, when focusing on other tasks, people are not in the right
mindset to make good decisions regarding security.
Cyber-espionage has been constantly trending upwards since 2009, putting
more pressure on companies security solutions. What is worse: according to
[2] at least 10% of all data breaches in companies 2013 were due to employees
misuse or other unintentional errors. About two-thirds of these breaches were not
discovered by the breached company. Furthermore, after years of touting on how
and why to select strong passwords, in 2012 weak or compromised passwords
accounted for 76% of all network intrusions[3], and in 2014 the 25 most common
passwords still accounted for 2.2% of all passwords on the Internet[4].
If companies keep moving the security solutions on to their employees, the
systems will become overly complicated, and although security training employ-
ees is important, it can become too taxing and there is a risk they will instead look
for less secure shortcuts just to get the job done. A security platform should be
unobtrusive and assist employees to keep their work secure instead of keeping
them from working.
1.1 Goal
The overall purpose of this thesis’ study is to design a concept of a responsive
enterprise security platform. The security in the platform should be invisible. In
this case responsive means that the concept should be generalizable to support
bring your own device (BYOD) and distributed work-environments, as well as
different kinds of authentication. Invisible security is defined as non-distracting
security where users are not expected to confront security decisions that require
special training.
1
2 Introduction
1.1.1 Research Questions
The analysis presented in later chapters will discuss the overall goal as well as
address these research questions:
• How do you design a platform which handles security without distracting
users from their main work-tasks?
• Is it possible to retain security while lowering user interaction?
• Which decisions can be automated, to what extent and in what situations?
• How are users’ trust and mental model affected when user interaction is
reduced?
When doing this, an evaluation of which security decision are important for users
with low knowledge in IT-security is needed. So is an investigation in how users
are affected when automating security.
1.2 Related Work
A vision of invisible security, similar to the one presented in this thesis has been
published by Intel Labs in [5]. The focus in their paper is on the home user. As
such some of the privacy considerations are not as applicable in an enterprise
environment. They base their paper on the notion that the authentication of to-
day is based on the technology of yesterday and they share their vision on how
invisible security could work in everyday scenarios. They also include the main
barriers they have identified that have to be solved before their vision could be
made reality. They are separated in three areas and consist of the following:
Technology
• Low powered, small biometric sensors.
• Algorithms for combining multiple sensors.
• System integration, cross-device support.
Business
• Hesitation in opening up identification and authentication between
companies.
• Concerns in competitiveness of devices and services.
• Cross-company integration is expensive. But ecosystem boundaries
must be overcome both from a business and a user perspective.
User Experience
• Privacy and integrity concern over world wide market.
• User trust and system observability.
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1.3 Delimitations
Due to the wide scope of this area, a number of delimitations have been put on
the thesis study and analysis.
The focus of the study will be on access control: When users are arriving at
their workstation, when users are performing operations and, to a lesser extent,
when users are leaving their workstation. In the spirit of user-centered design,
this thesis will be centered around the users perspective. The security aspects,
unless otherwise stated, are assumed to be up to the standards of today.
1.4 Outline
This report is divided into 6 major chapters and a number of appendices. The
remainder of the report is structured as follows:
Chapter 2
Describes the underlying theory used as a basis for this thesis. It has been
divided into three parts; HCI and user centered design, automation and
security related theory.
Chapter 3
Contains results and analysis from the identification of end-users’ needs
and current style of working, which was carried out with contextual inter-
views. The results are presented as sequence models.
Chapter 4
Presents the design decisions made for the concept of the security plat-
form. Results are presented in flowcharts and non-functional requirement-
diagrams based on the QuPer model.
Chapter 5
Discusses and analyses the results in this thesis and the recommendations
of future work to be done on the subject.
Chapter 6
This chapter is a summary of key elements from previous chapters and
presents a conclusion of this thesis paper.
Appendix A
Consists of the personas used to help discuss and analyse the result of the
user-survey presented in chapter 3.
Appendix B
Contains a legend for flowcharts. It is included to explain terminology and
appearance of the flowcharts in chapter 4.
4 Introduction
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Theory
“In short, all predictions agree
that if man does not master technology,
but allows it to master him,
he will be destroyed by technology.”
— ICRC (1987) [6]
2.1 Human Computer Interaction
Human Computer Interaction (HCI) can be defined as:
“[T]he design, evaluation, and implementation of interactive com-
puting systems for human use and ... the study of major phenomena
surrounding them.”[7]
According to Norman in [8], when a user interacts with a computer, the user cre-
ates a mental model over how the computer works internally. Interface design
can support HCI with interaction that conforms to users defined mental models
or supplements mental models that support intuitive interaction. It can also con-
fuse if the user’s mental model and user interaction suddenly doesn’t match. A
well made representation aids us in our mental models, as opposed to the inter-
action that thwarts our thought process by impelling us into mental states un-
suitable for the situation. Norman explains in [9] that it is the things that makes us
smart. Using computers (and other artifacts) greatly enhances the mental capacity
of users.
To aid in designing interfaces for HCI a number of best practices have been
established. Among the most recognised are Shneiderman’s eight golden rules
for interface design, described in [10]. These practices are:
Strive for consistency
Keeping a consistent terminology, layout and feedback across the system
creates familiarity. As does keeping order of sequence in similar situations.
Exceptions to the ordinary flow should be comprehensible and kept as min-
imal as possible.
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Cater to universal usability
Users have different needs. Experts might want shortcuts that allow for
faster navigation or pacing, novices need additional support to get into the
system. recognise the user diversities and aim to support everyone.
Offer informative feedback
Every user action should give feedback. The extent of feedback should
depend on frequency and impact of the action in question.
Design dialogs to yield closure
User interaction should be grouped into beginning, middle and end. Giv-
ing informational feedback at the end gives user a sense of relief and allows
them to drop it from focus and mind.
Prevent errors
As far as possible, prevent users from making decisions which result in
errors. This can be done by disallowing different kinds of input where it’s
not applicable. If an error occurs allow users a clear path of recovery.
Permit easy reversal of actions
Allowing users to undo actions and decisions relieves anxiety and encour-
ages exploration of the system which in the long term leads to expertise of
the system.
Support internal locus of control
Users should control the interface. The interface’s behaviour should not
change, data-entry should be simple and it shouldn’t be difficult to obtain
information from the interface.
Reduce short-term memory load
Avoid situations where users need to remember information between dif-
ferent states in the system. Provide a clear navigation of where users are in
the system and how they got there.
2.1.1 User-Centered Design
User-Centered Design (UCD) is a method for designing HCI-solutions. In [8],
Norman describes the main principle of UCD as keeping the users involved through-
out the design process. When users are not available personas can be used in their
stead like described by Cooper in [11]. The processes involved in UCD has been
standardised by ISO in [12] to include the following six principles:
• The design is based on an understanding of users, tasks and environment
• Users are involved in the design and development
• The design is driven and refined by a user-centered evaluation
• The process is iterative
• The design addresses the whole user experience
• The design team includes multidisciplinary skills and perspectives
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Critique
UCD is not without critique. Norman raises the point in [13] that over-reliance
on user-input can lead to overly complex systems with features many users may
not actually use or need (but when asked, want to have). Furthermore, Dearden
et al. points out in [14] that designing HCI with a specific end-user in mind, al-
though providing benefits for the targeted group, can lead to disadvantages for
others and, according to Abras et al. in [15], by making design user-centered
the designers lose overall perspective of workflow, thus excluding indirect stake-
holders. Complying different products with different stakeholders of different
cultures creates higher isolation of the products, which can lead to more com-
peting standardisations. Abras et al. also points out that these factors contribute
to the overall higher time and effort which raises cost required for UCD when
compared to e.g. feature driven design.
Norman raises another argument against UCD in [13], which is the ability of
humans to learn. If a system can do an activity really well; the struggle to learn
this system might be worth the effort. UCD aims to minimise the learning-curve
and workload of users, sometimes at the cost of system performance in the hands
of an experienced user. Exploiting human adaptability is not inherently bad.
2.1.2 Contextual Design
A variation of UCD is contextual design. Contextual design has its foundation
in Holtzblatt’s idea, which she describes in [16], that users cannot completely tell
what is good and bad in a system. Gathering user design-data without losing
details needs to be done while users are actually working on the system. By
observing and interacting with users in contextual interviews as they are working
in their normal work environment designers are able to see patterns and details
that would otherwise be missed. The purpose of these contextual interviews is
to get samples of concrete data on how users are actually working as opposed to
what company policies and other norms tell them they should (and users would
relay on to the interviewer). By observing users’ work as it unfolds it is also easier
to identify indirect stakeholders.
Sequence Model
A user’s actions in a system are not random. They follow a specific pattern as
they unfold over time, and the sequence in which actions take place reveals their
strategy in solving a task. By following this sequence, the user’s intents can be
uncovered. Intents may not be obvious at first glance, therefore revealing them
in a sequence model can provide valuable information for system designers. To
do this Holtzblatt proposes drawing Sequence models, like the one in figure 2.1.
The sequence model differs from similar models like flow diagrams and task
analysis by stating intents and triggers for each sequence explicitly. A breakdown
or detour from the original intent is marked with a lightning bolt.
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Figure 2.1: Example of a sequence model
2.1.3 Persona
Personas were first proposed by Cooper in [11] as a way of creating a baseline
for discussion in a design group. According to Adlin in [17], there are two kinds
of personas: Ad-hoc and data driven. Ad-hoc personas are less formal and de-
signed around their creators’ expectations and experiences around users. Ad-
vantages of Ad-hoc personas are that they are quick and effective to create and
help externalise preexisting presumptions the design team has about their target
users. Disadvantages are that they might not actually be representative of the
target users at all. Data driven personas allows more accurate representations of
the target users, at the expense of cost in creation.
A common mistake when writing personas is making too many. Holtzblatt
recommends in [18] that there should only be one persona for each key-role in a
project. When there are more than one persona for each role or when different
members of a design group want very different things in their persona there is
a high risk that the focus of the project is not well-defined enough or that the
design members has radically different views on the goal. This is usually a cue to
go back and reanalyse the data, purpose and goals for the project.
2.1.4 Distraction
As described in the sequence model section, all tasks are performed with a goal in
mind. HCI (when designed properly) can become a spontaneous tool in reaching
the goal. But, as Norman points out in [9], when a cognitive artifact calls attention
to itself, it creates a breakdown in the workflow. For example, When retelling a
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story we will often not only gesticulate, we will also use artifacts as representa-
tions for what we are describing. A cellphone could be an excellent representation
of a shoe(!). But when the cellphone suddenly vibrates the illusion is broken.
As explained by Bødker in the Scandinavian model of activity-theoretical HCI
[19]; computers are mediators in our daily lives. Interaction with a computer is
not done with the purpose of using the computer, it is used in order to achieve
a goal. The subject of the goal is normally not the computer either. Our goal to
communicate something with a co-worker will be achieved by writing an email,
reading news and online shopping are also merely mediated by the computer.
Once we left the learning phase, little conscious effort is spent on our interaction
with the interface itself. Reeves and Nass explains this in [20] as the media equa-
tion; we have a spontaneous and natural response to media in the same way as
social interaction with other people.
Every time we shift our attention from our goal we do a focus shift. A focus
shift can occur either from external distractions or from internal distractions. An
internal distraction can be a constraint from the artifact or unexpected behaviour
from it (bug or user misuse). Focus shifts can occur frequently and Reeves and
Nass has shown that their impact depends on how related tasks are to each other,
how long a user work on a task before the focus shift and how long the interrup-
tion was.
2.2 Automation
Automation has been and continues to be a highly controversial subject. Parasur-
aman and Riley defines it in [21] as “the execution by a machine agent (usually
a computer) of a function that was previously carried out by a human.” While
some, like Christoffersen in [22], highlights the benefits of automation; increased
productivity, efficiency and minimising human error. Others, like [23], argues
that yielding (too much) control to computers leads to knowledge decay. Nor-
man warns in [24] that it can lead to loss of situational awareness among op-
erators and, if you believe [6], automation will ultimately lead to the demise of
human civilisation (as we know it).
Welcome to the Matrix have a nice stay!
However, it is generally agreed upon [e.g. in 21, 24, 25] that automating a
task does not merely supplant human interaction but fundamentally changes it.
Parasuraman and Reeves points out in [21] that automating a task can lead to
better mental workload, but also worse if e.g. presentation is not aligned with
users’ mental model. U.S Federal Aviation Agency describes in their design stan-
dard [26] that automation should only be done to improve system performance,
without reducing human involvement. They also recommend training users in
when they should question automated systems.
As described in the distraction subchapter of this thesis, a breakdown in
workflow occurs when an artifact brings attention to itself. Automation works
in the same way, a change made by an automated system creates a breakdown
in its operators workflow, and if serious, as described in [10], it can cause the
operator to lose orientation with risk of severe consequences.
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2.2.1 Automation Induced Complacency
In some cases operators of highly automated systems experience complacency. ‘If
this task is automated, why should I care about it?’[27] Bailey et al. shows in [28]
that automation induced complacency (AIC) increases with system reliance and
it has a direct relation to trust and loss of situational awareness. High trust in a
system also has high AIC which leads to lower grade of attention spent observing
the system, especially if they are occupied with other tasks. When automating a
task for an expert, Culley points out in [29] that the trust will depend on the
expert’s trust in the designer of the automated system. ‘Do I trust the designer to
understand the intricacies of this task?’
According to Culley, one way to lessen AIC is to variate the degree of au-
tomation in a system. The system will then sometimes require user input and
sometimes it will do it by itself. But this can lead to a ‘cry wolf’ effect. i.e. user
latency for when the system fails becomes longer, since user input is no longer
only needed for critical tasks. Instead it is preferred to calibrate the resolution of
automation to user expectations.
Lee et al. describes resolution in [30] as how the capabilities of the system
maps to users trust in it. With high resolution users trust in components are
fairly separated and trust in certain components are not affected by performance
in others. In low resolution users trust in the system is seen as one entity and
therefore performance of components affect trust in others. If resolution is poorly
calibrated, users trust in a system does not match with the system’s capabilities.
This leads to, as described by Parasuraman and Riley in [21] and shown by Dzin-
dolet in [31], either misuse or disuse of the system.
Norman describes how good calibration can be done by providing relevant
feedback in [24], and Christoffersen adds the importance of providing high sys-
tem observability in [22]. Human-automation cooperation (HAC) should pro-
vide similar feedback as human-human cooperation. As described by Reeves
and Nass in [20], we know that automation is not human, and we do not expect
it to be, but we still act towards it as if it is! Some might take this to mean that
automation agents should be designed to resemble humans, which is not at all
the case. But as Christoffersen [22] and Lee et al. [30] describes, HAC should
provide the same cues in information transferal as human communications do.
2.2.2 Monitoring
Parasuraman has also shown in [21] that performance of monitoring automation
while simultaneously performing other tasks is usually poor. Performance is also
consistently poor both among operators who are accustomed to automated sys-
tems and those who are not. There is also a big problem with alerting users of
monitoring due mistrust caused by false alarms. Lee highlights in [32] that this is
not a trivial problem to solve, since false alarms are beneficial in keeping operator
preparation up to standards. If an alarm would alert at 100% hitrate, operators
might not recognise the alarm in time and be unable to figure out the correct
sequence of actions to correct this problem.
Experiments performed by Jamson et al. in [33] with smart cars showed
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that operators are reluctant to override automated behaviour even when they ac-
knowledge behaviour where they could improve performance (e.g. overtaking a
slower car in front of them). This could be either because of AIC but could also be
explained by the media equation; it is impolite to interrupt the automation. Fur-
thermore they showed that monitoring performance were dependent on whether
conditions were considered easy or difficult. High traffic areas were closer moni-
tored compared to light traffic areas. Lastly they showed that monitoring during
less demanding conditions lead to higher fatigue of operators.
Observations made by Kircher et al. in [34] highlights that monitoring au-
tomation is not a reactive activity but an interactive one. Operators include au-
tomation behaviour in their tactical planning of the situation as a whole. This
goes in line with the notion that HAC fundamentally changes a task and empha-
sises that HAC should provide information in a way suitable to the operators.
2.2.3 Levels of Automation
There are multiple distinctions and separations between levels of automation.
One example is provided by Parasuraman et al. in [27]. Many proponents, like
[23], for these distinctions want to use these levels as a mean to avoid over-
automation of tasks. But, Bradshaw et al. argues in [25] that models based on
these levels of automation are not only wrong and counterproductive, but also
dangerous towards design and discussion around automation as a whole. Fur-
thermore they claim in [35] that trying to define different kinds of automation as
more or less on a linear scale does not help designers in a meaningful way in-
stead it paints them in a corner. It is not helpful, and sometimes even impossible,
to say that this automation is more automated than that automation. Therefore
Bradshaw et al. recommends that models with levels of automation should be
kept as far away as possible from designers.
2.3 Computer Security
Verizon’s Data breach and investigations report [2] have identified users as in-
volved in some capacity in just about every breach recorded. It can be failure
to apply a patch, users’ mistakes, failure to comply with policies or intentional
malicious behaviour. A system is only ever as secure as the users that use (or,
according to some programmers; abuse) it. However, users can also be the great-
est asset. More breaches have be discovered by a company’s own users than any
other technology or process. Therefore, it is important to know your users, what
they are allowed to do in the system and what they actually do.
2.3.1 Access Control
Karp defines access control in [36] as “Access Control is the mechanism in which
the services know whether to honor or deny requests.” Traditionally access con-
trol has been isolated within a domain. E.g. a single application, website or
company, but nowadays this is not necessarily true.
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Access control is usually differed between discretionary access control (DAC)
and mandatory access control (MAC). As the orange book [37] describes, in DAC
the owner of an object sets permissions and restrictions while in MAC these per-
missions and restrictions are decided by the system. These two versions can be
used together.
A basic model of access control is identity based access control (IBAC). IBAC
authenticates users (henceforth known as subjects) on an individual level and
applies authorisation based on their individual privileges. This is quite cumber-
some to scale up as every new subject need to define their privileges for every
differing operation and object in the system.
Role based access control (RBAC) is a NIST-standardised [38] model for Ac-
cess Control. Compared to IBAC, RBAC assigns individuals roles, and applies
authorisation based on a predefined set of privileges carried by their role. It is
commonly used in enterprises today as it allows relatively simple means of ac-
cess control with better scalability as well as easier maintainability compared to
IBAC. Although RBAC still has problems with scaling across domains.
AAA – Authentication, Authorisation and Accounting
Authentication, authorisation and accounting (AAA) is a commonly used frame-
work for handling access and enforcing policies in computer networks.
Authentication is the identification of subject and/or host. Authentication is
commonly done with username/password combination, but it can also be
done by providing a token, biometric data or recognising user-pattern. In
[39], Gollmann describes these as providing something we know, some-
thing we have, something we are and something we do respectively. If
we provide more than one of these in a multi-factor authentication we can
be more sure that we authenticate the correct subject. Meanwhile, mutual
authentication is achieved when both subject and host authenticate each
other.
Authorisation determines what rights a subject has in the network, which ac-
tions are permitted and what resources are available to them. According to
[40], Authorisation can be viewed as the result when evaluating a subject
against the networks policies.
Accounting is the logging of user activity. It is needed to hold subjects account-
able for their actions and making sure policies are followed and contracts
are kept. Accounting is important for maintenance purposes, auditing of
the network and performance evaluation. Accounting is also the key com-
ponent in data forensics. Because no matter how prepared a company is,
incidents will happen.
2.3.2 Single Sign-on
Single Sign-on (SSO) services allow a subject to authenticate only once no mat-
ter how many services they are registered to. Gollmann warns in [39] about the
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curse of convience in SSO, i.e. making a system more convenient to use opens
up new angles for threats and attacks. Therefore SSO can’t just be added to tra-
ditional access control. Pashalidis and Mitchell describes different solutions to
SSO in [41]. In most of these solutions an authentication service provider (ASP) is
needed. There also need to be an established trust between the ASP and the dif-
ferent service providers (SP). When a subject authenticates to a SP they claim that
the ASP can vouch for their identity and the SSO scheme used provides means
for a SP to confirm this claim against the ASP. A high level flow diagram is of this
is shown in figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: High level SSO flow
2.3.3 Platforms and Protocols
XenApp and XenDesktop
XenApp and XenDesktop [42] are two platforms developed by Citrix which pro-
vide windows based software as a service (SAAS) or infrastructure as a service
(IAAS) respectively. This allows user’s to run their virtual applications on a cen-
tralised server through a number of different devices, ranging from thin-clients
and mobile phones to desktops. The virtual application can be accessed either
from a users web browser or through a dedicated Citrix receiver. Traffic between
the client and the centralised server is sent over a TLS encrypted channel.
These platforms use a protocol called Independent Computing Architecture
(ICA). In contrast to other Virtual Network Computing (VNC) services which
uses the Remote Frame Buffer protocol (RFB) to scrape the screen and send it
over to the client, ICA sends high level commands to the client similar to Mi-
crosofts Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). This allows XenApp and XenDesktop
to work more efficiently in situations where network throughput and reliability
is a concern.
Both these platforms allow users to temporarily suspend a session and re-
sume it on a new device. This feature allows users to easy migrate between dif-
ferent physical environments as well as faster re-authentications after a break. In
Citrix products this feature is known session roaming.
As XenApp and XenDesktop provides windows based software, the standard
authentication protocol is also Kerberos. Default is also a user name-password
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based login, but it is possible to change to allow other authentication methods
aswell. XenApp is SSO in the sense that one authentication is enough to use
all applications provided and XenDesktop in the sense that authentication to the
desktop authorises use of all applications on the desktop as well. A more in depth
description of the authentication in these platforms can be found in [43].
NetID
NetID is a smart card solution developed by SecMaker. Authentication with
NetID is done by inserting the smart card in a card reader and providing a secret
PIN-code. NetID is compatible with a large number of different authentication
methods and platforms, including Microsoft Windows and Citrix products. The
smart card itself contains a user certificate which is used to identify user access
and permissions. A more in depth technical description of NetID can be found in
[44].
NetID places a lot of focus on SSO, although their perception of SSO, which
is described in [45], differs slightly from the description in section 2.3.2. To them
SSO is the fuzzy feeling which takes place when a user can ease access most of the infor-
mation needed for their work.
In the default authentication procedure NetID will provide the user with a
Kerberos ticket which can provide a more traditional version of SSO, but there is
also support for alternatives like e.g. SAML.
FIDO
FIDO is a protocol for “password-less” authentication. It is maintained by the
FIDO Alliance and the first version (1.0) [46] was released in December 2014. A
big advantage to FIDO is that it allows authentication to be done with whatever
technology is available to the subject, e.g. biometric data through face recogni-
tion, fingerprints, palm veins etc. or token authentication like RFID, dongle, etc.
There are two protocols defined by FIDO: Universal authentication frame-
work (UAF) and universal second factor (U2F). UAF is used to provide any form
of authentication. e.g. a subject registers to a service by choosing and performing
any authentication method available to them on their current device. Now they
can authenticate themselves on that device by repeating the authentication reg-
istered. U2F is used to make authentication stronger by providing multi-factor
authentication. A service using U2F requires users to select and perform a sec-
ondary mean of authentication on registration. At any time after that, the service
can replace the original authentication method with this secondary authentica-
tion method.
FIDO works as a key store, i.e. for every service registered, FIDO creates an
asymmetric key pair and sends the public key to the service over a TLS secured
channel. The private key is stored in the FIDO application and can (only) be
unlocked and used by providing the authentication chosen at registration. The
private key will then sign a challenge from the service, proving the user is in
control of the private key, and thereby authenticating itself.
Chapter3
Identification of End Users
“Data is the source of invention
because it defines the need.”
— Karen Holtzblatt (1998) [16]
3.1 Survey
In order to get a better overview of the targeted end-users, contextual interviews
were set up. The interviews were scheduled for approximately one hour ses-
sions. This time span of one hour, was determined because most of the relevant
data was intermittent, and longer sessions were unlikely to yield better or larger
data sets. Instead, interviewees were asked to save or reenact targeted tasks and
situations. Following the interviews, interpretation sessions were held. Every in-
terpretation session covered two interviews and resulted in an insight list as well
as sequence models of interesting user actions. In total interviews were made
with 4 office workers from a corporate environment, 2 nurses from the health
care sector and 2 salesmen from retail.
The results are presented in the analysis later in this chapter and in order to
make the results more concrete and observable from an outside perspective, three
personas, Tom, Mary and Billy, were created, one for each interviewed work role.
They are presented in Appendix A. Reading them before the result of the survey
can help the reader to interpret its result.
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3.2 Sequence Models
3.2.1 Corporate
In total five sequence models were made over observed user behaviours among
office workers. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 describe the work sequence when a user wants
to log into the internal network, either internally or from an external network.
From a user’s perspective, both these sequences are longer than they have to be,
and although the breakdown at the time of observation didn’t seem to have any
impact on the user, if these situations are frequent enough, they can accumulate
into a breakdown.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 are the same sequence observed in two different users, the
later where a breakdown occurred. Since they occur at a time when the user is
just getting started or updated to the task the breakdowns in these sequences help
build frustration through repetitive actions, especially Figure 3.4, which requires
the user to take multiple steps back. Around these sequences there is a higher
risk that users need a break.
In Figure 3.5, a user leaves the workspace to coordinate with a coworker and
later returns and resumes working. This sequence shows almost every interaction
a user does towards the security system; Locking the screen when leaving the
computer, authenticating oneself when returning and the breakdown when being
denied.
Figure 3.1: Corporate sequence model 1
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Figure 3.2: Corporate sequence model 2
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Figure 3.3: Corporate sequence model 3
Figure 3.4: Corporate sequence model 4
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Figure 3.5: Corporate sequence model 5
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3.2.2 Health Care
Two sequence models were made from the interviews with nurses. Figure 3.6 de-
scribes how distribution of medicine works. According to the interviewed nurses,
the breakdown described in the sequence model is not rare. Sometimes the com-
puter freezes twice in a row and if that happens they would switch from the
laptop on the tray to a stationary computer further away, making them run back
and forth. Figure 3.7 describes the system for notifying municipalities that a pa-
tient, who is also a patient in one of the municipality’s health care programs, has
arrived to the hospital. According to both interviewees, this was the single most
loathed interface within the whole health care sector. The reason for this was how
unresponsive it was in combination with policies that required all requests to be
sent before noon. In both of these sequences we can see that the system must to
be responsive end-to-end in order to be secure. If a client’s hardware is too slow
or buggy, it can lead to security that is worse than no security.
Figure 3.6: Health care sequence model 1
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Figure 3.7: Health care sequence model 2
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3.2.3 Retail
From the interviews made in retail, three sequence models were drawn. Figures
3.8 and 3.9 describe when a salesman assist a customer with selecting products
through a computer interface. In both sequences there is a lot of repetition when
the salesman leaves the workspace and comes back. As can be seen in the se-
quence models, this leads to neglecting to log out in order to avoid these repeti-
tions and save time. Figure 3.10 shows when a customer wants to pay with credit
cards. It is interesting to note that salesmen does not only need to authenticate
themselves. Sometimes they also need to authenticate their customers.
Figure 3.8: Retail sequence model 1
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Figure 3.9: Retail sequence model 2
Figure 3.10: Retail sequence model 3
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3.3 Analysis
In this analysis, every work role will be analysed based on four common crite-
ria. These criteria are denials, security guidelines, sessions, users and they were
picked because during the interviews they were identified to be involved in either
the most distracting- or the most insecure behaviour.
Denials are defined as when authorisation fails or when a user for some other
reason is denied to perform a specific action. Security guidelines are the guide-
lines a user is informed of by the company, and expected to follow when working
with the system. A session in this case means one instance when interacting with
the system, starting with authentication and ending with a log out or time-out.
Users are concerning behaviour and preferences observed in the interviewees
that focuses on the users, and not the system.
3.3.1 Corporate
Beside the four criteria mentioned above, a fifth interesting observation was made
during the interviews with office workers: Copy-paste is used a lot.The purpose
is mainly transferring data between interfaces, this data is sometimes sensitive
information like passwords and the like. Copy-paste is also used for temporarily
storing or duplicating information and for re-factoring of information.
Denials are usually accepted without much resistance. One of the interviewed
exclaimed “Okay, that didn’t work” and then proceeded to try something else.
Dialogs were often unread, but they caused a slight focus shift, which prompted
users to try a different strategy. At a couple of instances users started experi-
menting, which was characterised by users flicking between different interfaces
and dialogs, and when asked what and why they were doing this one responded
with “I’m just looking.” During these phases focus shifts were very rapid, ap-
proximately once every few seconds. They did not last more than 1-2 minutes,
since they are mentally taxing, and often resulted in a work-break. Generally
users discarded more than necessary when facing a denial. It seems to be easier
to start fresh than to analyse where they went from.
Security guidelines get in the way of the users’ preferred way of working. Not
a single user obeyed all of their company’s security guidelines. For example us-
ing the remembering passwords functions, or circumventing blocks if they want to
listen to music, even though it is not allowed. They will also use coworkers to
attain information they might lack privilege of getting if they feel the need it for
work.
Multiple sessions are running simultaneously, with work done in parallel and
tasks alternating. Sometimes a task can be focused on for a longer period of time.
When returning to a task it is not uncommon that the session has timed out (see
Figures 3.3 and 3.4). These timeouts cause quite severe breakdowns as it requires
the users to take a few steps back, and it is not uncommon to lose a bit of progress.
When alternating tasks, users seem to re-evaluate their status in the task, i.e. to
Identification of End Users 25
read what they have written to make sure everything is still there or to perform
other kinds of damage control.
Users like to work on their own devices. This is probably at least partly due to
users wishes to be in control. One of the interviewed expressed that they like
to use their own devices from home, if they just want to check something really
quickly. Another user explained that they like sand-boxing, i.e. isolating them-
selves in their own environments. If they mess up it will only affect themselves
and therefore they can do more experimenting. It is possible that users might put
higher demands on their own devices. Denials might not be so unconditionally
accepted if they come from your own device.
3.3.2 Health Care
One denial is accepted, albeit frustrating. Two denials in short succession is un-
acceptable and cause users to completely abandon that task. Error messages are
not read. They are perceived to be targeted towards someone else, e.g. develop-
ers. Interviewees stated that they made that deduction since there was an error
code included. This behaviour seems to be learned through their general com-
puter experience and is therefore not likely to be un-learned by new design in the
dialogs.
Security guidelines create huge amount of friction. Extreme measures in very un-
safe ways are taken to work around these policies when they get in the way. The
implementation among the different wards are also different, providing friction
between wards and hospitals. Signatures to provide non-repudiation are only
used when they are required by the system, as it is when dealing and distribut-
ing medicine, and never when they are optional, as was the case when noting
readings and patient status. Even though all these actions required signatures
according to hospital procedures.
Sessions are kept alive for as long as possible since starting new sessions often re-
quire two or three different authentication steps. This means leaving the session
unattended for long periods of time. If someone arrives to an already authenti-
cated session they will use it directly and not go through the hassle of logging
out and authenticate themselves. This is even though they are aware of how ses-
sions are logged and audited, and what consequences it has in regards to patient
confidentiality etc.
Some applications require SITHS-card in combination with pin-code to au-
thenticate oneself and while the session is active the SITHS-card need to stay in
the dongle. It is not uncommon for nurses to forget the SITHS-card in the dongle,
leaving the card in the dongle while going away to do other tasks or finding other
SITHS-cards in or around the dongle.
In general, users seeem to dislike the computer interface for a few different rea-
sons. First of all, every ward has different needs, but the interface is uniform
throughout the whole health care sector. This goes against two of Shneider-
mann’s golden rules, which makes it harder for users to navigate and find the
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few functions and selections they need. Secondly, the system is slow and slug-
gish since the hardware can not handle the size of the system. Lastly, breakdowns
in the system usually require users to restart at the beginning. This causes a lot
of frustration for obvious reasons.
3.3.3 Retail
Denials were not observed during the interviews, although breakdowns in gen-
eral caused salesmen to just give up. Since the customer is standing on the side
waiting, there seemed to be no time to try again. It is probable that this behaviour
would also be applicable to denials.
Security guidelines required salesmen to log out or lock the computers when
they left them. During the hour of one of the interviews this policy was broken
a total of ten times among the 15 employees at the department. a few times the
computer was left alone for long enough that it went into hibernation. During
the other interview the salesman was working on a xen-app client (which makes
log in and log off quicker), and during the one hour interview this policy was
followed, but instead required the salesman to perform authentication approxi-
mately every 5 minutes.
When customers ordered an item directly from the salesmen, salesmen were
required to properly authenticate customers. They also needed to verify that the
customers’ identification was not forged by going through a seven step validity
check.
The more cumbersome it is to start a session, the more reluctant users are to end
it. When a session could be frozen with a simple click of a button and resumed
with a simple authentication, it was used more than when a session had to be
restarted. Other salesmen or customers did not hesitate to hijack a computer
with an active session if no one was using it. In fact it was preferred to hijack a
session rather than to take an empty computer with an active screen saver on it.
Users prefer the public customer interface instead of their internal system, es-
pecially when they are working together with the customer. There seem to be
several reasons for this. First of all no authentication is required, secondly the
customer interface seem to be more user-friendly. Lastly, when working with the
customer, both the customer and the salesman are actively manipulating informa-
tion on the computer. Customers seem more familiar with the public interface,
and the interaction was smoother (although customers also took an active role in
the private salex system).
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3.4 Requirements
From the analysis, three key requirements on a system were extracted. These
requirements provide the basis for design of a invisible security platform.
1. Since users will disregard security guidelines if they become too taxing, it
should be made easy for users to be secure, and hard not to be. That is, en-
courage secure behaviour and provide secure alternatives for the preferred
ways of working. Make sure that users know when they break the rules,
and audit it, not necessarily for punishment (often disregarded guidelines
need to be reevaluated). The simplest way of working must be secure.
2. Denial of use should be made more transparent. A denied action should not
trigger users to enter an experimental state of mind. Instead a denial could
trigger a the system to guide users into an alternative permitted sequence,
thus making a system denial less binary.
3. The longer it takes to get started, the less willing users are to end sessions,
and repetitive actions become more frustrating. SSO should be available to
avoid these repetitions and authentication must be quick. Sessions should be
freezable, and restorable with the same or easier means of authentication.
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Chapter4
Design
“When those who benefit are not those
who do the work, then the technology is
likely to fail or, at least, be subverted.”
— Grudin’s law [9]
Figure 4.1 contains the overview flowchart of the proposed invisible security
platform. A legend for flowcharts can be found in Appendix B. The flowcharts
in this section show the systems decision path for arriving at different states and
conclusions.
As shown by the flowchart in Figure 4.2, when arriving at the workspace au-
thentication should be proactive, i.e. don’t wait for user input to start initiating
authentication procedures (e.g. through voice recognition, near field communica-
tion (NFC) or facial recognition). But the system should wait for some sort of cue
before logging in. If the system has authentication methods that require active
user participation (e.g. password or token) the manual inputting of authentica-
tion is used as the cue.
Since users should be in control of the interface, even though the system
might hold all information needed to authorise user access, waiting for the user
to initiate a dialog puts the user in control. It also builds familiarity with the sys-
tem, which is helpful in making the dialog around denials less abrupt. If the user
has a frozen session in the system, it should be immediately resumed to avoid the
repetition which makes users less likely to freeze their sessions.
A new session can print a welcome screen. It provides closure for users and
gives them a sense of fulfilment. A welcome screen is also a pleasant interaction
which builds trust and helps users like the system.
There should be a shortcut to freeze a session or logging out with a single step
(e.g. a freeze button or grabbing a token). Longer steps make users more prone
to skip logging out. When it comes to session timeouts and screen saver, there is
a fine line between causing the user frustration by forcibly freezing a session and
helping a user maintain security.
Access control when users are authorised is not a problem but when users are
lacking authorisation, as shown in figure 4.3, the system should not be outright
denying a user. Instead, using a function like the operation pilot, a novel concept
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Figure 4.1: System overview flowchart
of this design, which prompts for higher access while allowing users to abort.
The operation pilot is less intrusive than an outright denial and places users in
control. It should therefore lessen the impact of breakdowns.
In health care, and other situations where denying the operation can have
severe consequences, it could be relevant to allow users temporary heightened
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access. Then another strategy could be replacing invisible security with “visible
security” by displaying eyes or red borders around the screen which makes users
aware of the system and that they are being especially monitored (this should be
further enforced by extensive auditing e.g. recording the screen and follow-up
meetings with supervisors).
Making users aware of monitoring will usually make them behave more obe-
diently, but it also causes more fatigue on the users compared to normal use.
Another consequence with this feature is that it allows better layering in the se-
curity as information that should only in special situations be available to a user
can be put in this layer.
Figure 4.2: Authentication flowchart
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Figure 4.3: Operation pilot flowchart
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4.1 Non-functional Requirements
Some of the problems causing the breakdowns observed in the survey were not
caused by (lack of) functionality in the system. Rather these breakdowns were
caused by the qualitative aspects of it. For example, too long response times and
too many options available caused breakdowns among the nurses. These aspects
can not be completely addressed in a flowchart, instead we need to look at non-
functional requirements (NFRs).
NFRs, or quality requirements as they are called in [47], are the requirements
on a system which does not decide what functions the system should provide.
Instead these are used to assure the system hold a high enough standard with
regard to reliability, security, accuracy, safety, performance, and so on. NFRs
should always be either measurable or restrictive. Restrictive NFRs are formu-
lated to express constraints on the system. For example A user should not be able to
obtain access to data without first authenticating herself.
For invisible security compliant platforms formulating an NFR as breakdowns
need to be kept at a minimum, although true, NFRs formulated in this way are hard
for designers to work with since they are imprecise and unverifiable. A better
way is to formulate the NFR as a user should experience breakdowns on average less
than every 10 minutes.
The process of selecting values for these measurements is not easy, and is
often based on the gut feeling of those who develop the NFRs. Although, more
systematic approaches exist, among them is the Quality Performance (QUPER)
model [48, 49].
The QUPER model gives a linear graph including benchmarks for varying
performance in relation to expectations and competition. Following is a rough
attempt at defining NFRs for invisible security using the QUPER model.The val-
ues used are estimations based on personal observations and influenced by [50]
regarding reaction times, and [51] regarding authentication failure rates.
Figure 4.4: NFR: Reaction time
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Figure 4.5: NFR: Authentication time
Figure 4.6: NFR: Authentication clicks
Figure 4.7: NFR: Failure rate
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4.2 Comparisons
NetID
Secmaker claims in [52] that users forgetting or leaving their cards is a myth using
a comparison between smart cards for authentication and bank cards. The survey
in this thesis disagrees with SecMaker’s claim. As has been described earlier in
the thesis, this problem seems to be twofold.
First, there is an attitude issue. Ordinary users do not think about security
when they are working. Their intent is most certainly that they will return at
a later time and resume working on the computer, there is no such plan when
withdrawing money from an Automated Teller Machine (ATM), which makes
a comparison between the two scenarios unfair. When users are leaving their
workspace they will perform a risk assessment. It is obvious from the contextual
interviews that leaving a session open is not seen as a high risk. It is also improb-
able that users can be convinced of the risks. The best way to solve the attitude
issue is probably through physical constraints; e.g. attaching the smart card to
the person with a wire. This would make it harder for a user to leave the session
running than to simply take the card and log out.
The second issue is performance related. When system performance falters,
breakdowns occur, and, as describe earlier, these breakdowns lead to unsecure
behaviour among users since it triggers users to look for new solutions to their
objective. For a smart card solution to be viable, it should conform to the NFRs
described in this chapter.
The reference values in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 for NetID is much lower than
the LTH school computers. The reason for this is that LTH computers use a
username-password combination for authentication while NetID use token with
four-digit pincode combination. The reference values for NetID are good, but
they still fall a bit short of the target levels for invisible security. The reason for
this is that NetID waits for users to initiate before starting logging in, in combina-
tion with the manual dexterity required to insert the smart-card into the dongle.
Fido
Fido has taken a quite flexible approach to authentication, as it allows users to
select which method of authentication they want among the ones currently avail-
able. This is a good way to get users to like the system as it places them in control
of the situation. It also allows users to discriminate against the methods of au-
thentication they dislike. It also allows users to update their authentication pro-
cedures. This is especially relevant in biometric authentication, where algoritms,
sensors and other hardware advances are still being improved.
There are however security concerns. Users do not have a habit of choosing
the most secure options and they tend to be reluctant to upgrade and abandon
old methods.
The idea behind U2F is hard to make compliant with invisible security. The
fact that it is up to the service to choose when to require second factor authen-
tication makes it likely to cause breakdowns. Furthermore, the second factor of
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authentication is not normally prompted for. This makes users more aware and
it is likely to make them more flustered and therefore more prone to breakdowns
if authentication fails for some reason.
XenApp and XenDesktop
Citrix’s platforms provides session roaming very similar to the suggested method
in this invisible security design. This feature provides users with a great deal of
mobility as they can freeze their session and then resume it on a different device.
Salesmen can move their session as they are moving with the customers, and they
will not freeze sessions for other salesmen when they freeze the session, as is the
case with many of Microsoft’s Windows products today.
Another nice addition with these solutions is that they allow for BYOD. Users
can use any device they want as long as they either have a Citrix receiver applica-
tion or a web-browser. This allows users to work distributedly or to make quick
checkups from their own devices. It also provides better security as user’s data
is kept in a data center instead of on users own devices. Therefore, responsibility
of security is mostly moved from users to system administrators, who are better
equipped and trained to handle it.
SSO
SSO differs in definition between the platforms. It seems that with the recent
popularity rise of SSO as a buzzword, sales talk is a factor. SecMaker’s definition
in [45] is actually resembling the idea behind invisible security of keeping the
system from distracting users quite a lot; the fuzzy feeling which takes place when
a user can ease access most of the information needed for their work. In their vision
they also raise the point that application providers need to comply with the de-
mands to make their applications SSO compliant, since most platforms already
have support for SSO solutions built-in.
SSO is a fundamental requirement to invisible security for the very reason it
has risen in popularity. It allows users to avoid unnecessary repetition of authen-
ticating themselves, which is both frustrating and time consuming.
Denials
Denials in the invisible security design are handled with a very novel approach
in the operation pilot. The possibility to temporarily raise a user’s access with
trade-off of harsher accounting, makes for interesting possibilities. None of the
platforms reviewed for this thesis provide anything resembling this. Their au-
thentication processes are all binary – either you are authorised or you are not.
Invisible security also aims at helping users to obtain authorisation. If they
lack the authorisation needed, the system should attempt to guide users through
the process or point to someone who can help. Again, this line of thinking is
novel with invisible security and lacking in the other platforms.
Chapter5
Discussion
“Essentially,
all models are wrong, but some are useful.”
— George E. P. Box (1987) [53]
The overall purpose of this thesis was to design a concept of a responsive
enterprise security platform. In order to do this, a survey of target users was
conducted using contextual interviews.
Contextual interviews are not very well suited for making NFR specifications.
More specifically, contextual interviews are aimed at gathering design data which
can identify patterns and reasons for user behaviour. NFR on the other hand typ-
ically requires hard data. As such, the NFRs provided in this report are rough
estimates and require more statistics and data to gathered before any major con-
clusions can be drawn from them. As of now, they mostly provide an rough
indication of the NFRs around invisible security.
Another problem with contextual interviews is that they assume a working
product for users to work with during the interview. Therefore contextual inter-
views are harder to utilise when designing brand new systems. This also makes
them less likely to lead to any revolutionary changes and ideas. Although, for the
purpose of this thesis, the use of contextual interviews felt relevant and effective
to make good estimations of user needs and behaviour, and the sequence dia-
grams were helpful in identifying user patterns and underlying reasons behind
that behaviour.
Research Questions
• How do you design a platform which handles security without distracting users
from their main work-tasks?
The design chapter in this thesis makes an attempt at answering this question.
The design decisions are based on the results from the user survey, but they have
yet to be tested and fully evaluated. Therefore the suggestions are still purely
theoretical.
One identified risk is with the operation pilot. The operation pilot has the
goal of making denials less binary and as such, making users less flustered when
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experiencing a denial. There is a risk that this will not work as intended and
instead make users waste their time while trying to get authorisation to perform
an operation they are not under any circumstances allowed to perform. This is
likely to build up frustration among users and make the inevitable breakdown
even more severe. In situations like those, maybe denying a user is a necessary
evil.
A interesting note for developers to remember is that error messages are not
read. So, important information should not be put in error messages. One of the
interviewees made an interesting comment on this subject: “Error codes are for
developers, this message has an error code, therefore this message is for devel-
opers and not for me.” Following this logic, make sure to allow the information
to be accessible from other through other means as well, even after a user has
gotten rid of the pop-up dialog since users are likely to just want it to disappear
as quickly as possible. This line of thinking is also consistent with Shneiderman’s
golden rule of allowing easy reversal of action.
To avoid breakdowns and frustration, it is important to not only look at de-
sign and functionality. Performance is an important aspect which need to work
seamlessly end-to-end. In this thesis four important NFRs have been addressed,
which need to hold a high standard in order to maintain an unobtrusive user
environment. Authentication failure rate and system reaction time were during
observations determined to cause the most severe breakdowns and frustration
among users. But long authentication procedures where one of the main causes
that kept users from logging out when they left the workspace unattended, and
this was the largest observed security vulnerability. Therefore all four of these
NFRs are essential to an invisible security platform.
• Is it possible to retain security while lowering user interaction?
One could argue that lowering user interaction actually raises security. As shown
in the survey of users, they are normally not in a mindset that promotes secure
thinking. Having security depend on responsible user interaction makes the at-
tack surface larger. Confining user interaction with security into special areas in
access control allows system designers to help users think about security only
when it is needed, so they do not have to worry about it all the time.
Traditionally, security and usability have been seen as two ends of a line. The
widespread use of passwords as means of authentication can be a large reason
for this line of thinking, since passwords are either considered hard to create and
remember when security concerns are address or easy to guess and crack when
user’s needs are focused. This thesis has made an attempt at looking at this prob-
lem from a different angle. Working with the basis that security needs to take
precedence over usability or usability over security is outdated. Many reports
highlight that users’ mistakes is the most common factor in security breaches.
Therefore, it is assumed in this thesis that usability is in fact included in secu-
rity. A user friendly platform is more secure than a system that causes users
frustration and forces them to make focus shifts between work and security on a
constant basis.
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• Which decisions can be automated, to what extent and in what situations?
There are methods to perform access control authentication in an automated man-
ner. Some biometric authentication, like facial or voice recognition, can work
automatically from a distance. Token authentication can also automate authenti-
cation, e.g. like Intel, who in [5] describe their vision of invisible security using
wearable computing. When these authentication methods discover a user they
can prepare for the user to login, allocate resources for their session and prepare
the session to be ready. This would lower the authentication time described in
Figure 4.5. The final decision to log in should always be left to the user. Other-
wise user control is forfeit which will cause many users distress.
A similar feature can be utilised when users are leaving the workspace, if a
user leaves the workspace the session can be automatically frozen so that other
users will not be able to use the session. It is important that sessions are not
left unattended since, as observed during the user survey, other people are more
likely to hijack a running session rather than start their own.
Another security feature that can be automated but has been outside the
scope of this thesis is tracking of user behaviour. When users are interacting with
computers, their strategy form a pattern. Things like writing speed and paths to
get into specific functions can be tracked automatically. As long as this behaviour
is consistent with past experiences, we can be fairly sure that the user is honest
and in fact who they say they are. But if these behaviours start to deviate from
normal behaviour, it is an indicator that something is wrong and we might need
to lower user permission or request stronger authentication to make sure the user
is not an impostor.
The last and most common thing to automate is the repetition of authentica-
tion in a single sign-on (SSO) scheme. SSO is very effective in lessening break-
downs in users work-flow. In a corporate environment there are also less privacy
concerns to consider, so in theory there should be no problems in utilising SSO
without first notifying the user. Although, a security concern is that if a user loses
their session to a malicious intruder, the impact can be far more severe.
• How are users’ trust and mental model affected when user interaction is reduced?
From a user’s perspective there are certain dangers when lowering user interac-
tions. As described in Chapter 2, automation does not supplant human interac-
tion. It is important that user expectations and trust match the system capabili-
ties. Therefore the system should keep a dialog with users to build trust and assist
them by providing mental models at a level suitable for them. Things like allow-
ing users the final say before logging in and providing a welcome screen when
they arrive the first time is a good method of building trust and it also helps in
calibrating the resolution of automation. For highly automated systems, mim-
icking human-human interaction seems to be effective for calibrating resolution,
since we already obey to the media equation.
Since the interaction removed in SSO-type solutions is repetition of interac-
tion already made, the risks in user trust involved is fairly small. Although, if
applications are very different, e.g. if users are mixing private applications with
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work applications there is a risk that users feel the system is leaking their pri-
vate information. I.e. telling applications about things the user do not want that
application to know.
There is a risk that users will feel that automatically freezing a session when
they leave the workstation is annoying, since it makes users repeat authentica-
tion more often, this can be solved by automatically resuming the session if users
return within a specified period of time and no one else has been on that main-
frame.
If tracking of user behaviour is used as a form of authentication, there are
a number of design decisions that need to be considered from a HAC point of
view. Taking another page from human-human interaction; be conservative how
and when telling users that they are being tracked. Making users aware they are
being observed, like in the case of visible security, when temporarily heightening
access, tends to make users self-conscious. This is generally bad for productivity
and raises fatigue of work. The same is true when tracking user behaviour.
5.1 Future Work
For this thesis a survey of user behaviour has been made. The survey resulted in
a design suggestion of an invisible security platform. The next step would be to
test, implement, and evaluate this model. More tests and investigation also need
to be made in order to obtain better measurements for the NFRs.
Another comparative survey of different authentication methods within in-
visible security would also be helpful for system designers who wish to use the
findings in this thesis.
If system designers for some reason want to keep knowledge based authen-
tication, new methods need to be developed since passwords and pin-codes are
neither user friendly nor secure. This thesis has worked with the hypothesis that
the problems in passwords and pin-codes are fundamental flaws in knowledge-
based authentication. But it is possible that this hypothesis is incorrect. Maybe
there are ways to create user friendly and secure knowledge based authentica-
tion schemes. In the words of Donald Norman: Representation fit for human use
makes us smarter. And it is obvious from years of use that passwords are not a
good fit.
Chapter6
Conclusions
In this master’s thesis a survey of users has been conducted using contextual
interviews. The survey concluded that when users are confronted in a conflict
between company enforces security guidelines and their planned method of con-
ducting work, security guidelines are neglected. This is amplified when the sys-
tem performance is poor and when guidelines consist of frequent repetitive ac-
tions like long or complicated authentication procedures. Furthermore denial of
access or permission to perform certain operations were determined to be highly
disruptive to user’s work. Based on this three requirements for an invisible secu-
rity platform were formulated. These requirements consist of:
1. The simplest way of working must be secure.
2. A denied action should not trigger users to enter an experimental state of
mind.
3. Authentication must be quick, SSO should be available to avoid repetitions.
Based on the result from the user survey, a design solution has been proposed
including a proactive authentication method with SSO, session handling resem-
bling session roaming in Citrix solutions and an operation pilot for guiding users
when permission is not immediately granted. The design solution also address
the need for a certain performance in order to keep users from getting distracted.
Authentication should always leave the final decision to the user in order to keep
users in control of the interface. Session roaming allows for fast re-authentication
of users who work in a mobile environment, it also eases BYOD and sharing
workspaces. The operation pilot was designed to allow temporary heightened
access with the trade-off of more a extensive, and noticeable accounting proce-
dure called visible security. This design has yet to be tested.
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AppendixA
Personas
A.1 Tom
Tom works at a Swedish company in Malmö. He has only been there for six
months. Toms current work task is to write user manuals for their product line.
For that Tom uses word since the company already have finished templates he
has to follow. When Tom works he likes to shut himself in a bubble, listening
to music helps him concentrate at the task at hand. Tom usually first prints the
specification on paper and highlights changes with a marker on the paper at the
same time as he writes it on the computer. He usually keeps two word documents
open at once, one where he saves information so he can quickly copy and paste
it into the other. Once he finished he sends a copy to his supervisor, Vivianne
through their mail client. She will proof read it and comment with corrections,
which is mark-upped with words’ internal comment system.
Tom [54]
Tom is quite social. He often joins his
coworker for after work and go for lunch
together. Besides work he plays pick-up
soccer in the weekends and he is a regular
at the local Cinema.
A typical workday for Tom starts at 8
am when he arrives at work. Usually he
starts his laptop and while it boots he goes
to grab a cup of coffee. When he comes
back he logs in with his password. Then he
starts his mail client and reads new mails
while drinking coffee. When he finished
his cup, he plugs in his headphones, logs in to the internal network and starts
working “for real”. Usually Tom works with preparatory work, first draft and
manual correction for 2-3 products at the same time, alternating when he gets
stuck or after about half an hour. At those moments he often goes for a stretch,
talks a bit with coworkers or refills his coffee.
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A.1.1 Tom’s Goals
• I want to learn how this company’s way of working, and
• work in the development team, and maybe at a later stage
• work as a manager.
A.1.2 What Do Tom Want From Us
Focus on his work. Sometimes Tom gets in the zone, and when he gets inter-
rupted he find it hard to get back in it.
Quick and easy authentication. When Tom arrives at the workstation he wants
to start working immediately. Since he often ponders on wording while
away, it is important to write them down before he forgets them.
Know what’s going on. Since he has manager ambitions, Tom still wants to know
what happens, learn how everything is connected and who is responsible
for what.
A.2 Mary
Mary is a certified nurse working at Scania University Hospital in Lund. She is
working in the infection ward which is split into two parts; A and B. Both section
has room for 8 patients and there is always a team of one certified nurse and two
unlicensed assistants in each of the two sections.
Mary [55]
The unlicensed assistants are not al-
lowed to dose and report patient condition
which means that Mary is responsible in
her team to handle the reporting and diag-
nosis and the only one who regularly need
to use the computer. Therefore she views
the laptop in her section of the ward as
hers. She uses the ward’s public passwords
when possible and for other applications
she uses the password “p” (so she can log
in using only one hand).
Scania University Hospital often have
trainees and since Mary has been there
for 3 years she will often supervise one of
them. When she supervise she tend usually
first show the trainees how they should
work and then give a couple of shortcuts on how to make it faster. Although
she will stress that these shortcuts should only be used when they lack time to
use the right way.
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A.2.1 Mary’s Goals
• I want to give patients the care they need and
• report patient status to my colleagues so that we together
• avoid misunderstandings and mistakes.
A.2.2 What Do Mary Want From Us
Start working immediately Mary’s work can be pretty stressful and sometimes
she will not have time to sit down and document until quite a while later.
It is important to get into the system immediately and without distractions
so she don’t forget details.
Save sessions Mary often have to leave abruptly to tend to emergencies. When
returning she wants to resume where she left off.
Help follow policies Mary want to follow the rules and regulations that exists.
But when her workload rises she always takes the easiest way, priority is
on patients. Therefore she doesn’t want to worry about working the wrong
way while she is focusing on her patients.
A.3 Billy
Billy works as a salesman in a major retail store with storehouses all over Europe.
Billy [56]
He started working five years ago in
the electronics department but has since
moved to kitchen appliances.
There’s usually three salesmen in
kitchen appliances and they share the two
computers used to order wares and assist
customers. Billy is the most senior among
all salesmen in his department so when
the other salesmen need help with assist-
ing a customer they often come to him.
Billy knows most products in their inven-
tory and he has learned the best shortcuts
in the computer interface.
Billy is a people’s person and he likes talking to and assisting customers, even
when it turns out they need something he is not able to provide. He believes it is
better to not sell something they customers do not need and building a customer
trust in their brand name.
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A.3.1 Billy’s Goals
• I want to make sure the customers get what they need, and
• making as much profit as possible, all the while
• maintaining an effective working structure.
A.3.2 What Do Billy Want From Us
Getting started immediately There is always a steady stream of customers, He
often takes them to the aisles to show them their products. This means he
will arrive at the workstation often. Some days more than a hundred times.
Therefore it is important for Billy to get started and booted up instantly so
customers don’t have to wait and build up a queue.
Save sessions When leaving the computer Billy can’t leave the computer logged
in for two reasons. First customers shouldn’t have access to their internal
system. and secondly his coworkers might need it will he is gone and they
should authenticate themselves for audit purposes. But Billy don’t want to
restart from the beginning every time he returns. Therefore he want to be
able to save or freeze sessions.
Not bound to one computer Since Billy and his coworkers share two computers
he want to be able to migrate his work from one computer to the other if
he returns and one of his coworker is busy with the computer he originally
worked on.
AppendixB
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Flowchart Legend
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